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1. Introduction 
 
This paper has several interrelated goals. First, it defends an interventionist 
account of causation by construing this account as a set of methodological proposals, 
rather than as a set of theses about the ontology or metaphysics of causation. Second (and 
relatedly), it attempts to use the topic of causation to raise some more general issues 
about the relation between, on the one hand, methodology, and, on the other hand, 
ontology and metaphysics, as these are understood in contemporary philosophical 
discussion, particularly among so-called analytic metaphysicians. I will use the topic of 
causation to argue for the importance and value of methodology, understood as an 
enterprise that can be pursued largely independently of one variety of 
ontology/metaphysics (what I call below ontology2/metaphysics2. But at the same time I 
will also suggest a way of bringing methodology and ontology/metaphysics closer 
together, by re-construing or reconfiguring some traditional issues about the ontology of 
causation as methodological proposals, following the approach recently advocated in 
Hitchcock, 2012.  I suspect that this irenic suggestion about reconfiguration is unlikely to 
fully satisfy the metaphysically inclined, since it involves abandonment of some core 
commitments   embraced by contemporary metaphysicians, but in my view, it has the 
advantage of replacing questions that seem unresolvable with more tractable alternatives.   
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2 describes what I 
mean by methodology and distinguishes two conceptions of ontology.  Section 3 
introduces the idea that interventionism should be understood as a set of methodological 
proposals, rather than as a claim about the ontology of causation.  This is then followed in 
Section 4 with a brief overview of interventionism. Sections 5- 8 describe various ways 
in which in which interventionist ideas can be used, methodologically, to clarify the 
content of causal claims and their relation to evidence. Section 9 compares the 
elucidation of causal claims provided by the interventionist program of associating such 
claims with hypothetical experiments with more standard metaphysically motivated 
demands that causal claims be elucidated by providing “truth conditions”. Section 10 
concludes by considering the prospects of re-construing issues about the 
ontology/metaphysics of causation as issues in methodology.   
 
2. “Methodology” and two conceptions of  “Ontology”  
 
     As a point of departure, we need some common understanding of key terms such as 
“methodology” and “ontology”.  I take methodology to have to do with how we ought 
(both the “we”—that is, we humans-- and the “ought” are important here) to go about 
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investigating, learning, and reasoning about various aspects of nature, about what sorts of 
theories we should construct, and about how we should reason about various important 
concepts in the scientific enterprise (such as “cause”).  I will also assume that we should 
think about methodology within a means/ ends framework: we have certain ends or goals 
(cognitive or otherwise) and we then evaluate various methodological proposals in terms 
of how well they conduce or contribute to such ends.  Methodological proposals are thus 
thought of as hypothetical imperatives, with their normative justification turning on how 
effectively they serve as means to our goals. Moreover, since effective achievement of 
our goals is what matters, methodology must take into account human epistemic 
limitations— for example, limitations on what we can observe, manipulate, and calculate.    
Thinking about methodology in this way, we may note that methodological 
proposals vary a great deal in their level of abstractness and generality. On the one hand 
we have very general recommendations like  “Construct falsifiable theories”.  On the 
other hand, proposals about method may also be far more specific – in connection with 
the methodology of causal inference, for example, they may involve techniques for 
extracting causal information from time series data or claims to the effect that only 
randomized experiments are reliable ways of finding out about causal relationships
2
.  
  What about “ontology”? On one understanding of this notion found (when the 
word is used at all) in some areas of science,  “ontology” simply refers to what are taken 
to be the most basic entities or properties or structures in some area inquiry or to the most 
useful or perspicuous way of classifying or conceptualizing these. (Here “basic” need not 
be thought of as carrying any metaphysical commitments; it instead  it has to do with 
which assumptions or starting points  or classifications  are best from the point of view of 
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 An anonymous referee asks how methodology, as I conceive it, relates to epistemology.  
Since I am not an epistemologist, I hesitate to make claims about this matter, but insofar 
as the methodology of causal inference has to do with how one learns about or comes to 
know about causal claims,  I suppose one might,   if one wishes, think of  this portion of 
methodology as in part a branch or subspecies of epistemology. However, as I try to 
make clear, methodology as I conceive it, also has to do with issues that at least some 
readers may not think of as squarely within the province of epistemology –e.g., issues 
having to do with conceptual clarification, with discovery and search strategies, and with 
the  evaluation of reasoning patterns. (If one wants to think of these issues as part of 
epistemology as  well,  that is fine with me.)  I will add that , as I think of it,   
methodology is not particularly concerned with  many issues on which contemporary 
analytic epistemologists  focus such as the explication of such ordinary language 
epistemic  notions as “X knows that p” or the construction of  responses to skepticism.   
In addition, methodology is, often at least, domain specific in the sense that it operates 
with the assumption that the methods that are appropriate for learning about or reasoning 
with facts in one domain of inquiry may not carry over into investigations of other 
domains—for example,  methods for testing non-causal statistical hypotheses  are not 
identical with methods for causal inquiry and so on. So methodology often requires some 
degree of subject matter specific knowledge—it is not  “theory of knowledge”, conceived 
of as general, domain-independent inquiry. I will also add that in my opinion the 
legitimacy of methodology as a subject of philosophical interest does not require that it 
be subsumed under or connected to the concerns of analytic epistemology.   
 3 
scientific theory construction, allowing for the possibility that different answers to this 
question may be appropriate depending up one’s goals and the level of analysis sought.)  
Let us call this ontology1.  It is ontology in the sense of ontology1 that geneticists have in 
mind when they speak of constructing a “gene ontology” or that cognitive neuroscientists 
have in mind when they speak of the importance of constructing a “cognitive ontology”.  
For example, in the latter case, a cognitive ontology might provide a catalog or typology 
of basic cognitive processes and operations of a sort that can be used to answer questions 
about how the operations performed by different neural regions or circuits should be 
characterized at a cognitive level (does amygdala activity involve “fear processing” of 
some sort or more general reward processing of positive and negative stimuli?), whether 
different neural regions should be thought of as performing the same or different 
cognitive operations, whether various experimental tasks involve the same or different 
cognitive processes and so on. On this understanding, constructing an “ontology”  (that 
is, an ontology1) is a matter of ordinary empirical or scientific investigation and the 
entities in such an ontology are not taken to have any sort of special “metaphysical” 
status (whatever that might be) – they are just familiar objects of inquiry of the sort 
studied in the various sciences. If by ontology we mean ontology1, it seems completely 
uncontroversial that methodology and ontology are and ought to be closely linked. The 
reason for this is the truism that our methods for investigating particular scientific 
domains should be attuned to the entities and structures those domains contain and that 
different sorts of investigative and reasoning methods may be fruitful for different sorts 
of entities and structures, depending on the features of the latter.  For example, if the 
correct cognitive neuro-ontology is that the basic structures or units of analysis in the 
brain are distributed networks of various sorts, then different methods for identifying  and 
reasoning about these will be appropriate than if one thinks that the basic units are highly 
localized neural areas.   As another example, if the ontology1 of some domain is that it 
contains structures in which values of key variables change over time in a way that is 
causally influenced by previous values of those variables and complex feedback 
relationships are present, generating data in the form of time series,  such domains will 
likely require different methods of causal  analysis than   structures which are acyclic and 
can be assumed to have settled into some sort of equilibrium state which generates cross 
sectional data.   
In contemporary philosophical discussion, however, “ontology” and 
“metaphysics” (in so far as this is connected to ontology) typically seem to be understood 
in a rather differently from the notion of ontology1 just described and in a way that makes 
connections with “methodology” much less straightforward.  I will call these enterprises 
ontology2/metaphysics 2. Although I am unable to provide a general characterization  of 
when a project counts as ontological2/ metaphysical2 , there are certain diagnostic 
markers: including  a tendency to focus on certain distinctive  questions and to  go about 
attempting to answer them in  certain distinctive ways as well as the  use of a distinctive  
terminology and (in some cases) a tendency to postulate special sorts of entities  that 
seem different from  more  ordinary  objects of scientific investigation. For example, 
ontologists2 often focus on questions like the following: what are the “truth-makers” or  
“grounds” for causal claims  (laws of nature?, powers and dispositions?, relations of 
necessitation between universals?) According to many ontologists2, failure to provide 
such truth-makers leaves causal claims unclear or problematic or at least involves a 
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dereliction of philosophical duty of some kind.  Another FAQ (by ontologists2) has to do 
with the  “relata” of the causal relationship—are these events?, processes?, tropes?   Yet 
another issue is whether causal claims be “reduced” to claims that are non-causal  – such 
as “Humean regularities”.    Use of words such as “Fundamental”,   “Reality” and 
“Ground” (especially when capitalized) and inquiries organized around these concepts 
are also often indicative that one is in the presence of an ontological2 inquiry, as when a 
writer asks what “Causal Reality fundamentally consists in” or “Whether causation is one 
of the Fundamental Constituents of Reality”.  Appeals to “intuition” or supposed 
intuition-like sources of information (even if the word “intuition” is not used and terms 
like “judgment” are substituted) to provide constraints on the results of investigation are 
also often indicative of an ontological2 project, as when it is suggested that our intuitions 
suggest that causal relationships are “binary” and “intrinsic” relationships between events 
(cf. Paul and Hall, 2013). Finally, another important feature of ontology2 is that the 
results of its inquiries are not supposed to be influenced by “merely pragmatic” factors 
having to do with human goals, interests or epistemic constraints—instead, insofar as 
there is a goal to such inquiry it something like the description of the most fundamental 
aspects of reality.  Since, as I conceive of it of it, methodology is heavily influenced by 
such pragmatic factors, this is one important reason why it is more independent of 
ontology2 /metaphysics2, than some suppose. 
I concede that the distinction between ontology1 and ontology2 is not always sharp 
or obvious. (Indeed, it is hard to avoid the uncharitable suspicion that practitioners of the 
latter sometimes have an interest in deliberately blurring the distinction, in an effort to 
make their enterprise look more continuous with ordinary empirical science.)  But the 
absence of a sharp dividing line does not mean that there are no clear cases.  Papers 
appearing in Science, Nature or the Physical Review, even when they report the discovery 
of novel “entities” or structures  such as the  Higgs boson (and  which thus might be 
regarded, if one wishes, as contributions to ontology1) , are very, very different in  terms 
of content, argumentation,  and evidence appealed to than what is found in, say, Tooley  
1987 or Paul and Hall, 2013 (much less Sider, 2011). If standard philosophical accounts 
of theory-testing, evidence,  explanation  and so on recognize no sharp difference 
between these enterprises (as is sometimes claimed by contemporary metaphysicians
3
) 
that  reflects the inadequacy of those standard  philosophical accounts rather than 
indicating that ontology2 is just ordinary science, pursued at a higher level of abstraction.  
 
3. Interventionism as Methodology, not Ontology2    
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much more specific and constraining strategies for assessing evidential and explanatory 
import.  
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   I said above that methodology requires a specification of ends or goals we are 
trying to achieve in inquiry.  In turning now to methodological issues having specifically 
to do with causal reasoning, it is thus crucial that we begin with a consideration of the 
goals or purposes distinctively associated with the causal concepts  and reasoning 
strategies.   Interventionists like me (cf. Woodward, 2003) think that among the goals 
distinctively associated with causal reasoning is the discovery of relationships that are 
exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control and the discussion that follows will 
be framed around this idea. However, there are certainly other possible candidates for 
goals associated with causal thinking—these might include, for example, finding compact 
and unified (or “strong” and “simple”, in the sense of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of 
laws) representations of correlational relations.  In principle, one might equally well 
apply a means/ends framework to justify methodological principles connected to the 
discovery of representations having this sort of feature.  
   The conception of methodology advocated in section 2 is a broad and expansive 
one.   In connection with causal reasoning, it certainly includes, for example, algorithms 
for extracting causal information from passive observational data of the sort described in 
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000, but it includes much more besides.  I list 
immediately below some issues that arise in connection with causal reasoning that I see 
as methodological in nature or that can be fruitfully interpreted as issues in methodology.    
Where appropriate, I have tried to bring out the difference between these questions, 
interpreted methodologically, and questions of a more ontological2/metaphysical2 nature, 
thus suggesting how the latter might be reconstrued in terms of the former. 
 
• On what grounds, if any, is it justifiable to distinguish between cause and 
correlation—that is, what is the methodological justification for drawing this 
distinction and, given our methodological goals,  how or on what basis should we 
draw it? A more specific version of this question is the following: Given a 
regression equation describing a correlation (3.1) Y= bX+ U under what 
conditions does this have a “causal interpretation” – that is, what conditions must 
be satisfied before we are warranted in interpreting (3.1) as correctly claiming that 
X causes Y in accord with the quantitative relationship in (3.1)?  This is a very 
frequently asked and fundamental question in statistics and econometrics.  Of 
course one might also interpret this question in a more 
“ontological2/metaphysical2” way, as asking whether, ontologically speaking, 
causation “just is” correlation or whether fundamental reality contains only 
correlations or whether instead it contains causal relationships understood as 
different from or over and above mere correlation. However, one can also 
construe the question methodologically, as I have above—that is, as a question  
(or questions) about what goal or purpose is served by drawing the 
cause/correlation distinction in the way that we do,    about what, if anything, 
would be lost if we did not make this distinction about the sorts of empirical tests 
might be used to distinguish true causal claims from mere correlations and so on.  
 
• A more general but related question is this:  what features must be present in a 
relationship for us to justifiably judge that it is causal?  For example, must a 
“connecting process” between cause and effect be present? Are so-called double 
 6 
prevention relations  (in which e would occur in the absence of d, d would prevent 
e if d were to occur, and the occurrence of c  would prevent  d, thus permitting the 
occurrence of e)  relationships in which c causes e?  Again, it is common to think 
of this as a question in the ontology2/metaphysics2 of causation but one might also 
think of the question as a normative/methodological one: given our 
methodological goals, what rationale, if any, is there for insisting on the presence 
of a connecting process if a relationship is to count as causal or for distinguishing  
dependence relations in which a connecting process is present from those in 
which it is not? What, if anything, would be lost or missed if we regarded all 
relations of non-backtracking dependence as causal, whether or not a connecting 
process is present?   
 
• What are some of the features that a causal claim should possess for it to be clear 
and unambiguous?  How can we clarify causal claims that are unclear and make 
them more precise?  This can be regarded as a kind of “semantic” project, but, as 
we shall see, it seems quite different from the more ontological2/metaphysical2 
project of trying to specify the semantics or meaning of causal claims by 
providing reductive truth conditions.  
 
• What sorts of procedures for testing causal claims are reliable or warranted and 
what sorts of evidence is required to establish such claims? How does inference to 
causal conclusions from evidence and other assumptions work?  When is it not 
possible, even in principle, to answer certain causal questions on the basis of a 
given body of evidence?  
 
This list is very far from being exhaustive: the methodology of causal reasoning includes 
much more besides these issues (see Woodward, forthcoming) but it will be more than 
enough to occupy us in what follows
4
.   
  
4. Basic Ideas of Interventionism 
 
With this as background, I turn now to some brief remarks introducing 
interventionism and then to some particulars concerning its role as a methodological 
thesis.  The basic idea is that causal relationships are relationships that are potentially 
exploitable for manipulation and that, as a matter of methodology, it is illuminating and 
fruitful to associate causal claims with claims about the outcomes of hypothetical 
experiments – that is, as claims about what would happen to a candidate effect variable if 
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has surfaced when I have presented this material orally. I do not mean to claim that  
appeal to an interventionist framework is the only way of addressing methodological 
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way of thinking about methodology. I do not consider it to be an objection to a 
methodological framework that there may be other frameworks that lead to similar or 
additional (but consistent) conclusions. 
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one to intervene on a candidate cause variable.   Here is a very simple version of an 
interventionist characterization of one particular notion of  “cause”, where X and Y are 
understood as variables:   
    
   (M) X causes Y iff (i) it is possible to intervene on X and  (ii) under some such 
possible intervention on X, changes in the value of X are associated changes in the 
value of Y.  
 
The causal notion characterized here is a type-level notion that I have elsewhere called 
total causation.  I have separated the rhs of (M) into two distinct clauses in order to make 
it explicit that (M) involves (i) a commitment to the possibility of intervening on X as 
well as (ii) a claim about what would happen to Y under such an intervention.  I do not 
have a fully satisfactory account of what “possible” means in (i) but will assume in what 
follows that a necessary condition for intervention to qualify as possible is that be 
logically or conceptually possible.  
Heuristically, an intervention on X with respect to Y causes a change in the value 
of X which is such that the value of Y changes if at all via a route (or routes) that goes 
through X and not in some other way. In the characterization of this notion in Woodward, 
2003,  interventions  were taken to be (4.1)  hard or arrow-breaking   – that is, it was 
assumed that the effect of an intervention on some variable X is that the value of X  
comes entirely under the control of the intervention variable (it becomes a function of the  
intervention alone, and not of any other  variable), so that  all other endogenous causal 
influences on X are “broken”. 
 (4.1) is convenient for some purposes, but it is often methodologicially fruitful to   
relax this requirement, as has been shown in recent work by  Eberhardt  (e.g., Eberhardt 
and Scheines, 2007).  In particular, we may generalize the notion of an intervention so 
that:  
 
(4.1*) Interventions can be “soft” and non-arrow- breaking, in the sense that they 
just supply an appropriately exogenous and uncorrelated  source of variation to 
the variable  X intervened on, rather than breaking all other causal influences on 
X. Here “appropriately uncorrelated” means that the variation supplied by the 
intervention I should not be correlated with other causes of X or with causes of Y 
besides those that are on the route from I to X to Y.  
 
On this conception, what is crucial to the notion of an intervention, is that the variation 
supplied to the variable X intervened on be such that it affect the candidate effect Y only 
through X and not via some other route. This condition can be met by soft as well as by 
hard interventions. We will make use of modification  (4.1*) below.  
 
 
5.  The Methodological Fruitfulness of Construing Causal Claims as Claims 
about the Outcomes of Hypothetical Experiments: Distinguishing the Target 
 
With this as background, I turn to some criticisms that have been advanced 
against interventionism. I believe that insofar as these criticisms have force, they 
 8 
depend in large measure  on construing interventionism as an ontological2 / 
metaphysical2 thesis. The criticisms are less telling if instead one thinks of   
interventionism as a methodological proposal. 
The first criticism (cf.  Strevens 2007,  Baumgartner 2009,  perhaps  Glymour 
2004) is that (M)  is viciously “circular” because it claims to elucidate the notion of 
X’s causing Y by appealing to a notion (that of an intervention) which is  obviously 
itself causal in character. An adequate account of causation, the critics claim, must be 
non-circular—it must be “reductive” in the sense that it explicates what it is for X to 
cause Y in terms of concepts (like “regularity”, “correlation” and so on) that are 
themselves entirely non-causal. Often this is put in terms of the complaint that (M) 
fails to provide “truth conditions” or “grounds” for causal claims, where the 
assumption is that these must take a reductive form. (cf. Hiddleston, 2005, Reutlinger, 
2012)  
 The second worry is this: when an experimental manipulation of X can actually 
be carried out, it is perhaps plausible (the critic says) that (M) provides one way of 
discovering whether X causes Y. However, even in this case, the critic claims, this 
criterion is (at best) of purely epistemological significance. It doesn’t tell us anything 
about the ontology2/ metaphysics2 (or semantics) of causation-- what causal claims 
mean or what causation “is” or anything like that.  Moreover (the critic continues) 
when an appropriate experimental manipulation of X is not in fact  (or cannot) be 
performed, it is even less clear how (M) could possibly be illuminating: (M) connects 
“X causes Y ” to a counterfactual about what would happen if an intervention on X 
were to occur, but how can that counterfactual be of any use if we can’t carry out the 
intervention in question? (M) (the critic concludes) may describe a  test that can 
sometimes (but by no means always) be used to determine whether X causes Y– do an 
experiment–  but has no significance beyond this.  
My discussion in Woodward, 2003 makes it clear that interventionism does not 
furnish a reductive theory of causation.  I’m also willing to stipulate that 
interventionism has little or nothing to say about the ontology2 of causation.  But I 
don’t agree that interventionism is for this reason uninteresting or unilluminating.  It 
may be ontologically2 unilluminating, but I contend that it is methodologically 
illuminating.   
To motivate this claim, I begin with an empirical observation that reports a 
frequently made normative claim:  researchers in a number of different disciplines 
claim that it useful or illuminating to connect causal claims and the results of 
hypothetical experiments in something close to the way described by (M).  For 
example, the potential response framework developed by Rubin, Holland and others  
(e.g., Rubin, 1974, Holland, 1986) and now widely used in   statistics, econometrics 
(see references below), and elsewhere in social science is organized around  
construing causal claims in just this manner. Moreover, researchers adopting this 
approach are quite explicit that they regard it as illuminating even when the 
experiment associated with a causal claim is merely “hypothetical” or “possible”–  
that is, when the experiment is not  in fact carried out and even when, although the 
experiment is  in some relevant sense possible, there are barriers of various sorts to 
actually carrying out, so that it remains (in this sense) “hypothetical”. Indeed, one 
prominent recent discussion (King et al., 1994) goes so far as to claim that in those 
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areas of the social sciences in which it is difficult to carry out actual experiments, the 
notion of experiment is “useful primarily in understanding non- experimental design” 
(p. 125). 
Of course critics of interventionism may respond that these researchers are simply 
confused or suffering from some sort of false consciousness—they think that this 
connection with purely hypothetical experiments is useful and illuminating when it is 
not—but I would advocate a more charitable approach in which we try to understand, 
at both a methodological and perhaps a psychological level, how it is possible for this 
connection to be informative.  A key idea which will serve as organizing principle in 
what follows is this:  an interventionist conception of causation can be 
methodologically illuminating in virtue of its role in characterizing the target to 
which we are trying to infer when make causal inferences in non-experimental 
contexts: Roughly, in non-experimental contexts we are trying to infer what the 
results of a hypothetical experiment would be without doing the experiment. 
Construing the inferential task in this way has distinctive implications for the causal 
questions we should ask and the sort of information that is relevant to answering 
them.  
To illustrate the basic idea as it appears in the econometrics literature, I draw on 
some remarks about causal inference from a recent influential econometrics text, 
Angrist and Pischke, 2009, although I might equally well have drawn on any one of a 
number of other sources. The first remark occurs in the context of a discussion of 
what it means to talk of the “causal effect” of different hospital treatment regimes on 
patient recovery:   
 
Causality means different things to different people, but researchers working in 
many disciplines have found it useful to think of causal relationships in terms of 
… potential outcomes  [which] describe what would happen to a given individual 
in a hypothetical comparison of alternative hospitalization scenarios. Differences 
in these potential outcomes were said to be the causal effect of different 
hospitalization regimes on patient recovery. (2009, p.52)  
 
Elsewhere Angrist and Pischke make it clear that their  “hypothetical comparisons” 
are to be understood in terms of possible experiments, although not necessarily 
experiments that are actually carried out:  
 
We hope to find natural or quasi-experiments that mimic a randomized trial by 
changing the variable of interest while other factors are kept balanced. Can we 
always find a convincing natural experiment? Of course not. Nevertheless, we 
take the position that a notional randomized trial is our benchmark. (2009, p 21, 
my italics)  
 
In another context, speaking of an inference from non-experimental data concerning the 
causal effect of education on income, Angrist and Pischke  quote the following remark 
from Ashenfelter (1991) a prominent researcher in this area: 
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How convincing is the evidence linking education and income? Here is my 
answer: Pretty convincing. If I had to bet on what an ideal experiment would 
indicate, I bet that it would show that better educated workers earn more (2009, p.  
21)  
 
My gloss on these remarks is the following:  Angrist and Pischke (and Ashenfelter) take 
the true causal effect of education on income (or hospitalization regime on recovery) to 
be what would be revealed in an ideal hypothetical experiment in which education  
(hospitalization regime) is manipulated (by an “intervention-like change, as in a 
randomized experiment) and the associated change in income observed.  This serves as a 
benchmark for what the true causal effect is – it is the target they are trying to discover or 
the standard for whether the inference is reliable.  In other words, inferences to a causal 
effect from non-experiment data are seen as correct or reliable to the extent that such 
inferences tell us what the result of an appropriate hypothetical experiment would be. If 
some candidate inference procedure employed on non-experimental data delivers certain 
causal conclusions and a properly performed experiment is brought to bear on the same 
inference problem, with  results that are different from those in the non-experimental 
inference procedure, it is the results of the experiment that provide the standard for 
correctness and the results of the non-experimental procedure that should be rejected as 
mistaken.   These ideas about the role of hypothetical experiments in providing a 
normative standard are most naturally viewed as methodological claims rather than 
ontological2 claims.    
     Angrist and Pischke also emphasize another way in which hypothetical 
experiments can figure as a regulative and clarifying ideal in causal inference:  
 
 If you can’t devise an experiment that answers your question in a world where 
anything goes, then the odds of generating useful with a modest budget and 
nonexperimental survey data seem pretty slim. The description of an ideal 
experiment also helps you formulate causal questions precisely. The mechanics of 
an ideal experiment highlight the forces you’d like to manipulate and the factors 
you’d like to hold constant. (2009, p.5) 
 
    The methodological ideas in these passages are ideas that are naturally 
suggested by an interventionist construal of causal claims. In particular, we may interpret 
Angrist and Pischke as suggesting that associating causal claims with hypothetical 
experiments can help to:  
 
(i) Pick out the target information we are trying to discover when we engage in 
causal inquiry (the outcome of a hypothetical experiment) and in doing this 
also help us to clarify the original causal claim or make it more precise. 
 
(ii)  Show that certain causal questions we may be tempted to propose are not 
answerable, at least with available data– not answerable either because they 
do not correspond to any possible experiment or because the actually available 
data cannot provide answers to questions about what outcome of the 
hypothetical experiment would be. 
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(iii)  Clarify and evaluate some of the methods used to infer to causal conclusions, 
particularly in the case of non-experimental data.  Very roughly, the idea is 
that  we ask whether the data are such that (in conjunction with appropriate 
other assumptions) they can be used to infer what the results of the associated 
hypothetical experiment would be if we were to perform the experiment,  
although in fact we don’t or can’t actually perform the experiment  
 
To get a more concrete sense of how these ideas work, it will be helpful to return 
to the issue of what is required for a regression equation to have a causal interpretation.   
Suppose, as above, we have two correlated variables, X and Y, and that we regress Y on X, 
yielding a regression equation of form  (5.1) Y= bX+U where  U is a so-called error term 
and the coefficient b  0 , since Y and X are correlated.   Recall that regression is a 
mechanical procedure that can be applied to any body of data in which X and Y are 
correlated (even if X does not cause Y or vice-versa) to produce an equation of form (5.1) 
describing that correlation.    Angrist  and Pischke  take the question of when (5.1) can be 
given a causal interpretation  to be equivalent to the following: “When can we think of a 
regression coefficient as approximating the causal effect that might be revealed in an 
experiment?” (2009, p. 51) In other words, their idea is that (5.1)  (correctly) describes a 
causal relationship between X and Y if  (5.1) correctly describes how the value of Y would 
respond to changes in the value of X in a hypothetical ideal experiment in which X is 
manipulated—  thus illustrating the characteristic interventionist idea that the standard for 
judging whether (5.1) describes a causal relationship involves reference to an associated 
hypothetical experiment.  
  I emphasize for future reference that  the question Angrist and Pischke are 
addressing is naturally  understood as an “interpretive” question in the sense that it has to 
do with what it means (in one perfectly good sense of “means”) for X to cause Y or what 
one is committed to in claiming that X causes Y.  But their answer to this question does 
not take the form of providing truth conditions or grounds in anything like the form that 
is likely to satisfy metaphysicians
5
.      
It might seem, paralleling the more general objection to interventionism described 
earlier, that there is an obvious objection to Angrist’s and Pischke’s suggestion about 
when a  regression equation has a causal interpretation—  it is circular in a way that 
                                                        
5
 Or at least this is so to the extent that the demand for truth conditions or grounds is 
taken, as it commonly is by metaphysicians, to be the demand for an account of claims 
like (5.1) in terms of what is taken to be ontologically fundamental or primitive and some 
such. The category of what is ontologically fundamental or non-derivative may or may 
not make sense, but I assume that no one thinks that claims about hypothetical 
experiments are ontologically fundamental in the relevant sense. Thus Angrist and 
Pischke fail to provide truth conditions for causal claims in the metaphysician’s sense of 
truth conditions.  Put slightly differently, if one accepts Angrist’s and Pischke’s gloss on 
(5.1) as illuminating, then what this suggests is that one can explicate or clarify the 
content of causal claims while failing to provide truth conditions in the metaphysician’s 
sense.  The paragraphs that follow in the main text attempt to explain how this is 
possible.  
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renders it completely unilluminating.  After all (it might be said) to know what the result 
of manipulating X in an idealized experiment, don’t I have to already know whether X 
causes Y (and, further, what the quantitative causal relationship, if any, between X and Y 
is)? If so, how can it possibly be illuminating to invoke  “what the outcome of a 
hypothetical experiment on X would be”?    
 There are a number of things that might be said in response to this worry, but, as 
a point of departure, let me note that one thing the invocation of hypothetical experiments 
does in this context does is captured by (i) above: this invocation directs attention to one  
possible goal or target or body of information one is trying to discover in contrast to 
others. In particular, there are (as the quotation above from p. 52 of Angrist and Pischke 
reminds us) many different possible accounts or proposals about what conditions a 
relationship has to satisfy to count as causal.  For example, as already noted, some writers 
hold that a “connecting process” between cause and effect is required. Other writers hold 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for X to cause Y is that X and Y be correlated 
when one controls for (conditions on) all other available information (or perhaps all 
information temporally prior to Y) –  indeed this is the implicit assumption behind a fair 
amount of social science practice, and behind many philosophical theories of 
“probabilistic causation”, as well as tests for so-called Granger causation in 
econometrics. Still others hold (roughly) that a necessary and sufficient condition for X to 
cause Y is that X is a non-redundant part of a condition K that is nomically sufficient for 
the occurrence of Y where “nomic sufficiency” means there is a fundamental law linking 
K to Y (cf. Paul and Hall, 2013, pp. 14-15). One of the things that (M) and the 
interpretation of causal claims in terms of hypothetical experiments does is to provide a 
criterion for (or proposal about) causation that aims to distinguish causal relationships 
from these other sorts of relationships.  Although this is more obvious in the case of some 
of these alternative proposals than others, M differs extensionally from each of the above 
alternatives in the relationships it regards as causal. For example, double prevention 
relations obviously can satisfy M even if no connecting process is present.  And although 
I lack the space for detailed discussion, it is arguable that the relationship between 
correlated measurement outcomes in an EPR-style experiment involving two particles in 
a singlet state can satisfy the non-redundant nomic sufficiency requirement above, but 
fail to satisfy M, since one cannot use the measurement outcome on one wing of the 
experiment to manipulate the outcome on the other—this is not a relationship that even in 
principle is exploitable for manipulation.  Notice also the important point that M can play 
this sort of distinguishing or target specifying role without being “reductive” in the sense 
of providing a translation of causal claims into claims that are entirely non-causal in 
content.  Even if we agree that an adequate ontology2 of causation must be reductive, it 
does not follow that to play the methodological role of target described above, M must be 
reductive.  
 
6. The Methodological Fruitfulness of Construing Causal Claims as Claims 
about the Outcomes of Hypothetical Experiments: Clarifying the Content of Causal 
Claims 
  
 Another respect in which the association of causal claims with the outcomes of 
hypothetical experiments can be illuminating (and which can help to make apparent how 
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a non-reductive account like M can help to clarify the content of causal claims) is this: 
Causal claims are often advanced in forms that are unclear or indeterminate or 
underspecified—this is particularly likely to the be case when they are represented in a 
simple “Cs cause Es” format, as in “smoking causes lung cancer”. Associating causal 
claims with hypothetical experiments in the manner described in (M) helps to make such 
claims more determinate, clear, and precise—it does so by making it explicit that they are 
to be understood in terms of one particular hypothetical experiment (which we specify) 
rather than another such experiment.  Among other things, making the hypothetical 
experiment associated with a causal claims explicit requires that we be more precise than 
we often are about which variables are being claimed to be causally related and what 
their possible values are.  In particular, within an interventionist framework, a precise 
characterization of a causal claim requires that we specify at least two possible values for 
the cause variable (since we think in terms of an intervention changing one of these 
values to the other) and then indicate how changing the cause variable from one of these 
values to others leads to changes in the value of the effect variable.    
As an illustration, consider the claim (cf. Glymour, 1986) that 
  
(6.1) Smoking five packs of cigarettes a day causes a substantial increase in the 
probability of lung cancer. 
   
One (uncharitable) way of associating this with a hypothetical experiment is to interpret 
(6.1) as claiming   
  
(6.1*)  Any intervention that changes whether someone smokes five packs a day 
to some smaller number of packs (e.g. 4.9 packs) will cause a substantial change 
in the probability that person develops lung cancer.   
 
  Another, more charitable interpretation of (6.1)—probably closer to what is 
likely to be intended by someone asserting (6.1) -- is to interpret it as claiming that  
  
(6.1**)  An intervention that changes whether someone smokes five packs to that 
person not smoking at all causes a substantial change in the probability of that 
person developing lung cancer.   
 
  (6.1*) and (6.1**) are different claims about the outcomes of different 
hypothetical experiments.  It is likely that they have different truth values: (6.1*) is likely 
false and (6.1**) is likely true.  Someone asserting (6.1) can thus clarify what is meant by 
indicating which of (6.1*) or (6.1**) is the intended interpretation.     
As a second illustration, consider the claim  
 
 (6.2) Being a woman causes one to be discriminated against in hiring.  
 
Interventionists are inclined to regard (6.2) as unclear and to think that it can be 
made clearer or disambiguated by making it explicit just which claim about the outcome 
of a hypothetical experiment is intended.  From an interventionist perspective, the basic 
problem with (6.2) as it stands is that the notion of a manipulation of or intervention on    
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“being a woman” or “gender is unclear” – there are a number of different things that 
might be meant by this claim. 
One possible way of manipulating gender is to change an individual’s sex 
chromosomes immediately after conception (substituting an X chromosome for a Y or 
vice-versa
6
.) Interpreted with this particular intervention in mind, (6.2) might be 
understood as claiming that  
 
(6.2*) Changing an individual sex chromosomes so as to alter their gender 
immediately after birth  would change  that person’s probability of being hired for certain 
jobs.  
 
A second, alternative construal of (6.2) which I would guess comes closer to 
capturing what most of those asserting intend to claim is this:   
 
(6.2**) Intervening to change an employer’s beliefs about the gender of an 
applicant will change that person’s probability of being hired.  
 
One way of bringing out the difference between (6.2 *) and (6.2**) is to note that 
(6.2*) would be true under a regime in which hiring is based entirely on the applicant’s 
merit and qualifications as long as different genders develop different interests and 
abilities that cause them to be differentially  qualified for various jobs.  If what is 
intended by (6.2) is a claim to the effect that hiring decisions involving women are not 
made on the basis of the applicant’s merit and qualifications and that qualified women are 
not hired because of their gender, (6.2*) does not capture this. By contrast, (6.2**) comes 
closer to capturing what is presumably intended by (6.2).  Note also that in the case of 
(6.2**), the variable which is viewed as the target of the intervention (and the cause) is 
“employer beliefs about gender” rather than gender itself. This illustrates how the 
interventionist framework forces one to be more precise about which variables are the 
intended causal relata.  I emphasize that the framework accomplishes this by providing a 
criterion  for when a candidate variable in a causal claim is such as to make the claim 
unclear or in need of clarification—this will happen when there is no unambiguous well-
defined notion of manipulation associated with the variable in question or when there are 
different things that might be meant by a manipulation of the variable in question and 
different outcomes of such manipulations.  Thus the interventionist framework yields the 
result that  “gender” is probably not a good variable (for the reasons described above) and 
that causal claims concerning the effects of gender can be disambiguated by associating 
them with different claims about the outcomes of the manipulation of different candidate 
cause variables.
7
  
                                                        
6
 Some may claim that such a manipulation would change the identity of the individual 
involved. This claim plays no role in the argument that follows.  
7
 An anonymous referee suggests that my remarks here amount to nothing more than the 
triviality that “you should be precise about which variables are the intended causal relata” 
and that this is something “you can endorse while denying interventionism in all of its 
forms.”  I have tried to make it clear that interventionism goes beyond this triviality in 
providing at least some guidance about which variables are appropriate variables for 
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(6.2 **)  is a claim that might be (and in fact has been tested) by, for example, 
submitting otherwise identical resumes in which only the gender of job applicants has 
been altered. By contrast, quite different data would be required to determine whether 
(6.2*) is true. In any case, the important point for our purposes is that (6.2*) and (6.2**) 
are non-equivalent claims which may well have different truth-values.  It does not seem 
controversial that it would be worthwhile for someone asserting (6.2) to think through 
which of these possibilities he or she has in mind.  
These examples provide illustrations of how associating causal claims with 
hypothetical experiments in the manner of (M) can force one to be more precise and 
explicit about what causal claims commit us to and how they might be tested, thus 
making sense of the fact, noted above, that researchers in many disciplines find this sort 
of association useful. Again, note that this sort of precisification (or clarification of 
meaning) does not proceed by providing a reduction of causal claims to non-causal 
claims, but can be methodologically useful despite this—the clarification comes from the 
specification of additional commitments and structure associated with the original claim, 
rather than by providing a reduction. We may think of these examples (and others 
discussed in this essay) as illustrations (in connection with causation) of that portion of 
methodology that has to do with the clarification and critique of concepts. 
Part of the answer, then, to how interpreting causal claims as claims as claims 
about the outcomes of hypothetical experiments can be illuminating despite its apparent 
“circularity” has to do the kinds of considerations described in this section and the 
previous one. In addition, however, I believe that there is a aspect of this issue that has to 
do with the empirical psychology of human cognition and the ways in which humans 
“store” information.  In particular, when one initially  entertains a causal claim like “X 
causes Y”  it is often the case that not all of the implications of this claim  or  all of the 
information relevant to testing it  is explicitly integrated into one’s causal judgment.   
That is, one can entertain the claim that “X causes Y” without thinking, at least very 
clearly and explicitly, about just what would be involved in changing or manipulating X 
or how one expects Y to change under various possible manipulations of X.  Nonetheless, 
the latter information may be information that one “possesses” in some sense, perhaps 
merely tacitly or implicitly, or at least it may be information that one might readily obtain 
                                                                                                                                                                     
causal relata, when variables should be regarded as defective or “imprecise” , and so on.  
I have tried to emphasize that this guidance is at least suggested by the basic 
commitments of interventionism.  By way of contrast,  the restrictions described above 
(that there should be a well-defined notion of manipulation associated with each variable)  
does not follow as naturally from various other accounts of causation.  For example, it 
seems perfectly possible for a Lewisian to introduce a “miracle” that changes someone’s 
gender, gender can be an INUS condition for some outcome etc. I will also add that in 
general I do not think that it is good enough in formulating causal claims to be “precise” 
about which variables are involved. This is partly because one needs to be “precise” in 
the right way but also  because some choices of variables are (even if these can be made 
precise) defective from the point of view of formulating causal claims. There are a 
number of other plausible criteria governing variable choice besides the one mentioned n 
the text above, some of which are discussed (in some cases with an interventionist 
motivation) in Woodward, forthcoming b.  
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via further reasoning or empirical investigation. Associating “X causes Y” with a 
hypothetical experiment forces one to explicitly incorporate this information into one’s 
causal judgment.  There thus can be a sense that one has genuinely learned something 
new by representing this association
8
.    
 
7.  More on The Methodological Fruitfulness of Construing Causal Claims as 
Claims about the Outcomes of Hypothetical Experiments: Unanswerable Causal 
Questions 
 
I suggested above that in addition to clarifying and disambiguating causal claims, 
associating causal claims with hypothetical experiments can also help us to see that 
certain causal queries are unanswerable, either in principle or with available data—they 
are unanswerable because the data cannot be used to tell us what the outcome of the 
associated hypothetical experiment would be.  As an illustration
9
, consider the following 
causal question: does starting school at a later age cause children to do better in school—
e.g., does starting school at age seven rather than six lead to better educational outcomes, 
in the sense that children learn more effectively from a year in school (as first graders) at 
age seven than at age six? This is a prima-facie sensible question which, if answerable, 
would have important policy implications.  We might try to make the question more 
precise and operational by framing it as the question of whether a later age of starting 
school for a child leads to higher test scores at some later time.  This in turn suggests a 
hypothetical experiment: randomly select some children to start first grade at age seven 
and others to start first grade at age six, expose them to a year of first grade schooling, 
and then compare their test scores at the end of first grade.  However, thinking in terms of 
this hypothetical experiment draws attention to an obvious problem: in addition to 
whatever effect school starting age has on test scores, there is also a maturation effect on 
test scores— children who start school at age seven will on average do better on tests 
simply because they are older, independently of any effect of start age on school 
achievement.  This may suggest that what we need to do is to somehow hold fixed or 
correct for this maturation effect so that we can assess whether, independently of this, 
start age has an effect on achievement—that the relevant hypothetical experiment is one 
in which the effects of maturation are controlled for, while start age is manipulated, all 
children receive a year of schooling, and the effect on achievement is then observed. A 
moment’s thought, however, should suggest that this hypothetical experiment is 
impossible, at least as long as we take maturation to be measured just by chronological 
age. The problem is that it is a mathematical identity that start age (S)  = chronological 
age (M) – time in school (T).  We are supposing that T is fixed by the experiment at one 
                                                        
8  Thus in thinking of (M) in this way, we are not construing it as a purely descriptive 
claim about what people always or usually have immediately in mind when they make 
causal claims—  we are not claiming that they always associate causal claims with 
hypothetical experiments and so on. On the contrary, we recognize that they often do not 
spontaneously make this association,  but argue that they ought to, as a way of making 
causal claims more clear and precise.  
 
9
 Again drawn from Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 6-7. 
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year, and hence one cannot in addition hold M fixed while changing S. Thus, it appears 
that there is no way even in principle of doing an experiment which would disentangle 
the effects of maturation and of age of starting school on achievement, at least if we are 
confined to the data we have been considering and have no other way of measuring the 
relevant variables.  If causal claims must be interpretable as claims about the outcome of 
possible experiments, we know that no inferential procedure, however sophisticated, will 
answer the causal question with which we began. In this case, interventionism shows its 
methodologically usefulness by clarifying what can be learned about causal relationships 
from certain sorts of data. In particular, the impossibility of performing a certain 
experiment turns out to be methodologically informative.  
 
8. The Methodological Relevance of Interventionism to Causal Discovery 
 
 I want now to shift to a different topic, which I think also illustrates the 
methodological usefulness of interventionism.  As noted above, M allows for the 
possibility that one can learn about causal relationships from many different sources, 
including passive observations not involving interventions.  In cases in which one learns 
that C causes E on the basis of passive observations, what M implies is that one should 
think of oneself as having learned that E would change under some intervention on C, but 
without actually performing the intervention in question.  Contrary to what one might 
initially suppose, this idea has genuine methodological bite because it suggests that if 
one’s evidence is not sufficient to establish such claims about what would happen to E 
under interventions on C, one’s evidence is not sufficient to establish that C causes E. In 
particular, it suggests  a general strategy of evaluating proposed causal inferences on the 
basis of whether they provide evidence that allows conclusions to be reliably drawn about 
the outcomes of appropriate hypothetical experiments. (Recall the remarks from Angrist 
and Pischke above in which exactly this evaluative strategy is advocated.)  
   Certain procedures for inferring causal conclusions such as the use of 
instrumental variables or regression discontinuity designs are readily justifiable on the 
basis of the consideration just described, while other procedures are not.  I will briefly 
illustrate this by reference to instrumental variables. Suppose that the problem we face is 
to estimate b in a context in which the data generating process is represented by (8.1) 
Y=bX+ U,  X and Y  are our candidates for cause and effect variables, respectively, and U 
is an error term that is correlated with X.  Assume also that the context is one in which 
the equation is intended to have a causal interpretation.  As is well known, when X and U 
are correlated, we cannot use the simplest possible estimator for b, involving ordinary 
least squares.  We can, however, reliably estimate b if we can find an instrumental 
variable Z for X with respect to Y.   Such an instrument Z is a variable that (i) is 
associated with  X,  (ii) is independent of U,  and (iii) is independent of Y given X and U . 
When these conditions are satisfied, it is widely accepted that the use of the instrumental 
variable Z  allows us to estimate b and leads to reliable causal inferences.  (See, e.g.,  
Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In particular, if Z is an instrument for X with respect to Y 
meeting the above conditions, then b*= cov (Y,Z)/cov (X,Z) is an estimator for b,  
interpreted as the causal effect of X on Y. Thinking of causal claims within an 
interventionist framework helps us to understand why under conditions (i)- (iii), use of an 
instrumental variable for estimating a causal effect is a reliable procedure: under these 
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conditions, Z functions in a way that is intervention-like in its relation to X with respect to 
Y. In particular, Z is in effect a “soft intervention” in the sense described in section 4. The 
underlying intuition is this:  under the above conditions, any variation in Z which is 
associated with Y must be due to the causal influence of X on Y, rather than being due to 
some other source, such as a confounding variable, which is precisely the condition for 
Z’s being a soft intervention. Thus the covariation between Y and Z (normalised by Cov 
(X,Z))  provides information  about what would happen to Y were an intervention on X to 
be performed, which is just the information required for causal interpretation according to 
the interventionist.  
 Other causal inference procedures such as regression discontinuity designs can be 
evaluated in a similar way, also by asking whether they provide reliable information 
about the results of a hypothetical experiment . It is thus mistaken to claim, as critics have 
sometimes asserted (e.g. Russo, 2012), that interventionist accounts have nothing to say 
relevant to the methodological assessment of testing or inference procedures for causal 
claims in non-experimental contexts.  
  
9. The Relation Between Methodology and Ontology2 Revisited: The Role of 
Truth Conditions 
 
Despite the remarks above, I suspect that many metaphysicians will continue to 
believe that ontology2/metaphysics2 has an important role to play in methodology. After 
all, it may be said, virtually by definition, ontology2/metaphysics2 concerns what is most 
“fundamental” or what “grounds” everything else. How could this fail to be relevant to 
methodology? One answer is simply that what is most “fundamental” from the point of 
view of metaphysics may not be what is most important or useful from the point of view 
of methodology. In support of this assessment, consider the very large literature outside 
of philosophy (in statistics, econometrics, epidemiology etc.), referenced in passing 
above, that pursues methodological issues concerning causation, apparently very 
successfully, but also apparently without addressing ontological2/metaphysical2 issues at 
all. Of this course it might be responded that this literature is misguided (or could be 
improved by appropriately incorporating ontological2/metaphysical2 considerations), but   
this is a claim that needs to be argued for in detail, rather than simply asserted.    
To expand on this point, consider how various ontological2 claims about causation 
in the philosophical literature might be brought to bear on the methodological issues 
described above. Suppose, for example, that a completely reliable oracle tells you that 
causal claims are grounded in relations of necessitation between universals or involve 
“mutual manifestation” relations among powers (cf. Mumford, 2009). How exactly does 
this help with such projects as clarifying unclear causal claims, specifying reliable 
procedures for inferring causal conclusions from non-experimental data, clarifying when 
a regression equation has a causal interpretation, and so on? Asking these questions 
suggests that these ontological2 projects seem to be addressed to very different issues than 
the methodological issues described above.  
 This point seems to me to hold even for ontological2 projects that attempt to 
make more direct contact with current science such as the common suggestion that the 
“truth conditions” for causal claims are to be found in fundamental laws of physics that 
“underlie” or “ground” those claims. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is 
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defensible as a piece of metaphysics.  Again we may ask whether this helps with 
methodological problems, at least as these arise in areas of science that are concerned 
with causal reasoning outside of fundamental physics. There are at least two general 
grounds for skepticism. First, in the case of most of the methodological problems 
described above, no one has any idea how the relevant underlying laws (even if they are 
known) might be brought to bear. Suppose that one is interested in the causal effect of 
education on income and is looking for an instrumental variable that might be used to 
estimate this effect (or, more generally, is simply interested in understanding the rationale 
for employing an instrumental variable). No one has a clue how to “translate” variables 
like “education” and “income” into the language of fundamental physics or what physical 
laws link these translated variables or how to specify an appropriate instrumental variable 
in this language. Certainly researchers interested in the causal effect of education on 
income don’t proceed by looking for such underlying truth-makers.  Of course one can 
insist that if education has a causal effect on income, the appropriate underlying laws 
linking physical specifications of these variables must be “there” and that if these two 
variables are merely correlated no such law will be “there”, in this way attempting to 
capture the difference between causation and correlation in this case. But, as nearly as I 
can see, this contention, even if correct, is completely unhelpful from the point of view of 
methodology, given our ignorance of the underlying physics associated with this causal 
claim. A similar point seems to apply in connection with the other methodological issues 
discussed above— for example, how can facts underlying physical laws help to clarify 
the content of unclear or ambiguous causal claims, given the epistemic unavailability of 
these underlying facts?   
 It may seem tempting to suppose that, although in many cases it is difficult or 
impossible to obtain information about the truth-makers (fundamental laws etc.) 
underlying upper level causal claims, it is nonetheless true that if we somehow had such 
information,   it would be  a good scientific strategy to   make use of it to “ground” 
procedures having to do with testing and reasoning about upper level causal claims. In 
other words, as an “in principle” mater, if we had information about underlying details, 
couldn’t we use it to provide a really secure and reliable foundation for upper level causal 
claims? In fact, even this as far from obvious. As Wilson (forthcoming) has emphasized, 
in areas of science outside of fundamental physics, a common key to successful inquiry is 
to make the reliability of theorizing and reasoning as independent (epistemically and 
methodologically) as possible of underlying fundamental physical details, precisely 
because these are so epistemically inaccessible and so difficult to reliably model.  In 
other words, it is often good method not to make one’s inferences and theorizing hostage 
to whether one has got the details of the underlying physics right. Thermodynamics is a 
paradigm of a successful science that follows this sort of approach: complex systems with 
astronomically many degrees of freedom at the level of fundamental physics are 
characterized in terms of just a few macroscopic parameters whose interrelations are in 
many cases surprisingly independent of the details of their microscopic realizations.  (So 
much so that much of classical thermodynamics would remain as it is, even if matter at 
the fundamental level were continuous, as long as it continued to satisfy certain generic 
constraints.) As Wilson emphasizes, this strategy can produce results that are far more 
epistemically secure than strategies that require bottom-up modeling from fundamental 
physics (even if, contrary to what is typically  the case, we have enough apparent 
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information to attempt such a bottom-up approach). I believe that a similar moral holds 
for methodology: as a simple illustration, consider that a properly designed experiment 
showing that treatment with a drug causes recovery from a disease can yield secure 
causal knowledge even if the experimenter has no idea what the fundamental physical 
laws underlying this causal claim are. In other words, the experiment can provide a route 
to secure causal knowledge that not only does not “go through”  this underlying 
information but which insulates or protects the experimenter from having to know it.  A 
similar conclusion holds for procedures like instrumental variables for inferring causal 
conclusions from non-experimental data. Thus not only is it the case that in actual fact we 
are very rarely in a position to even attempt to derive upper level causal claims from 
underlying physical facts and are forced to rely on other procedures  (such as 
experimentation) instead, but it is also the case that  use of those procedures is 
methodologically superior from the point of view of reliability.  
 I suggest that we  thus arrive at the following upshot. The metaphysically 
oriented philosophical literature contends that causal claims (and counterfactuals 
associated with them) cannot be “barely true”; and that these require a specification of  
“grounds” and “truth makers” before they can be legitimately employed. The idea is that 
by providing such truth-makers one somehow clarifies or renders respectable claims that 
would otherwise be problematic.  However, as far as methodology goes,  exactly the 
opposite conclusion often seems to be supported. When methodological discussion in 
econometrics, statistics and so on turns to the clarification of causal claims or  principles 
of causal reasoning  there is little or no invocation of truth-makers in the metaphysician’s 
sense. Instead clarification generally takes the non-reductive forms described above—
association of causal claims with hypothetical experiments, specification of non-reductive 
principles linking causal claims to evidence and so on. So, ironically, it is strategies that 
fail to provide truth-makers in the metaphysicians’ sense and that are non-reductive that 
turn out to be the useful and clarifying ones.   
 
10. Reconfiguring Ontological2 Questions as Methodological Questions 
 
My discussion so far has argued for the relative independence of methodological 
considerations from ontology2.  However, as I have intimated, it is certainly possible to 
bring these two topics closer together, roughly by reconstruing or reconfiguring 
ontological2/metaphysical2 questions as questions abut methodology.  A recent paper by 
Hitchcock (2012) provides a beautiful illustration of this.  Hitchcock’s concern is the role 
of time in the characterization and individuation of events figuring in causal 
relationships. As a matter of ontology/metaphysics, this tends to be put in terms of the 
question of whether the time at which an event occurs is essential to it— for example, if 
Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle, with Suzy’s rock striking and shattering the bottle 
at time t but where Billy’s throw would have shattered the bottle at time t +d, d>0   if 
Suzy’s throw had not occurred, is the bottle’s shattering at t the same event as the bottle’s 
shattering at t+d? This is a question that has received different answers from different 
metaphysicians.  However, one can also understand this issue in methodological terms, as 
concerning how we should characterize the variables that figure in causal relationships 
given that our goal is the perspicuous representation of what would happen under various 
possible interventions. When the question is put this way, then, as Hitchcock persuasively 
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argues, there are compelling methodological reasons to represent the shattering of the 
bottle at t, and its shattering at t+d by different variables—i.e., they should be represented 
as different events. One of the many advantages of this methodological turn is that it 
replaces the vague and difficult-to-answer ontological/metaphysical question about 
whether time is essential, with a more sharply formulated question, where it is also made 
clear what turns, in terms of methodological consequences,  on answering this question 
one way rather than another. 
One might pursue a similar strategy in connection with a number of the examples 
discussed above. As one illustration, consider the remarks in Section 6 on clarifying the 
content of causal claims by associating them with specific hypothetical experiments.  As 
readers will likely have noticed, this strategy maps in a straightforward way onto the 
familiar philosophical idea that causal claims can be thought of as having a contrastive 
structure—that one should think of a causal claim of overt form “C causes E” as having 
something like the underlying structure:  C rather than C* causes E rather than E*. Here 
this contrastive structure in effect specifies (at least partially) the hypothetical experiment 
associated with the original claim—intervening to change the cause from C to C* 
changes the effect from E to E*.  One might think of the contention that causal claims 
should be understood contrastively in this manner as an ontological (that is, ontological2) 
or metaphysical claim, which is how it is understood in Paul and Hall, 2013—see 
especially, pp.  21-23. Construed in this way, metaphysicians will have many objections, 
deriving from, e.g., conflicts with “intuitions” to the effect that causation is an “intrinsic” 
and “binary” relation between events and from the worry that the contrastive construal 
makes the “metaphysical character of the causal relation.. determined by human 
interests” (Paul and Hall, p. 22). Suppose, however, one interprets the question of 
whether causal claims “are” contrastive not as a metaphysical/ontological thesis but 
rather (along the lines followed in section 6) as a methodological proposal: that one can 
very often clarify the content of a causal claim and make it clearer by specifying the 
intended contrastive structure. Understood in this way, the basis on which 
“contrastivism” is to be assessed shifts in an important way, since the standard is now 
methodological fruitfulness rather than consistency with metaphysical intuition.  
Moreover, in contrast to the disputes surrounding contrastivism as a metaphysical thesis, 
the issue of whether construing causal claims contrastively is methodologically useful 
seems like an fairly straightforwardly answerable question—we can look to the additional 
information apparently provided by contrastive construals, actual practice of those 
involved in causal reasoning in various domains and so on.   
As a second illustration, consider an issue raised in passing above—whether 
double prevention relations are “causal”. Again one may view this as a question about the 
basic ontology2/metaphysics2 of causation (which is how it is usually understood) but one 
can also approach it in a more methodological spirit, as having to do with what grounds, 
if any, there might be for distinguishing double prevention relations (which lack a 
connecting process) from other non-backtracking, intervention-supporting dependency 
relations which do involve a connecting process. Woodward (2006, 2011), drawing in 
part on empirical results in Lombrozo (2010), pursues this sort of project, arguing that 
dependency relations involving a connecting process are typically more stable and more 
“exportable” to new situations than dependency relations lacking this feature and that 
since this sort of stability is something we value, it makes sense, methodologically, for us 
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to distinguish, in some way, between dependency relations for which connecting process 
are present and those for which they are absent. As an added bonus, this approach also 
suggests that there are good methodological reasons for distinguishing among double 
prevention relations with respect to their degree of stability, with more stable double 
prevention relations being regarded as more paradigmatically causal.  Again I would 
argue that if we are willing to re-construe issues about the status of double prevention in 
this way, they become much more tractable and it becomes easier to see what turns on 
answering them one way rather than another—something that is missing (in my opinion) 
when we simply ask whether double prevention relations are “really” causal.  
 Although I think that in these cases and many others, there is much to 
recommend this route of reinterpreting metaphysical questions as methodological ones, I 
acknowledge that most metaphysicians will not find this course appealing—it involves 
giving up too many of their characteristic concerns and assumptions. I nonetheless put it 
forward in an irenic spirit, as one possible way of engaging with problems that bear some 
similarity to those that have concerned metaphysicians, but with different standards for 
their solution.   
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